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Published reports have indicated that economic inequality greatly
increased in Nepal during the era of parliamentary democracy that began
in 1990. This paper revisits these inequality estimates by utilizing the
same original, Nepal Living Standard Survey data collected in 1996 and
2004, on which the reported estimates are based. But this paper goes
beyond the specific resources and methodologies used in the reported,
official estimates toward providing a more comprehensive picture of
economic inequality. Simply looking at household income and especially
consumption does not provide adequate basis to draw a specific patterns of
inequality for the country, it is also important to incorporate inequality of
household wealth in the equation. In addition to providing a
comprehensive picture of economic inequality with its potential sources,
this paper examines the demographic and spatial determinants changing or
un-changing the horizontal and vertical forms of inequality. Appropriate
social, political, and policy implications are also drawn.
The use of a consistent methodology to aggregate different forms
of household consumption, income, and wealth in a more inclusive
manner capturing the actual access of households to different kinds of
resources indicates that the degree of economic inequality was much
higher in Nepal in both years 1996 and 2004 than the one reported in the
official statistics. While the eight years covered in the analysis saw
marginal increase in inequality of household consumption and income,
together with slight decrease in inequality of household wealth, this does
not necessarily provide a very contrasting picture. The official estimates
tend to significantly attenuate the level of inequality for both survey years.
But this underreporting appears to have been much more pronounced for
1996, a sign that inequality estimates may be more comparable between
the two survey years. House rental, employment, business, and remittance
appear to be the major sources of inequality in income, where as the
ownership of real estate and businesses appear to be the leading sources of
wealth inequality, even though the latter form of inequality slightly
declined during the eight years of political turmoil in the country.
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The horizontal form of inequality, already quite large in the 1990s,
had increased considerably by 2004, especially along the caste/ethnic and
spatial lines. While the middle and lower caste Hindus and Muslims did
not change their economic positions compared to that of the high caste
Hindus, the Newars considerably improved their position and the Janajatis
considerably worsened their position. Quite surprising was the sharply
deteriorating economic position of the Janajatis, who were reasonably
well-positioned in 1996, despite contrary arguments by some
commentators of ethnic politics. There was also a very large and widening
divide in access to economic resources along rural/urban, regional, and
ecological distinctions. This together with the picture of rising vertical
inequality especially within some of the groups with changing inequality
dynamics suggests that the society of Nepal and its different groups have
grown increasingly unequal.
We do not clearly know whether this episode of the inequality
trajectory connects the dots to create a broader view of inequality in
Nepal. But these changing economic inequality dynamics are helpful to
explain some of the recent turns of political events. First, the Maoists
appear to have been able to capitalize on these unintended consequences
of the economic liberalization policies of the governments formed under
the rubric of parliamentary democracy. Second, the more recent issues of
ethnic factionalism and ethno-politics may have been a byproduct of the
parliamentary democracy of the 1990s, especially if the Janajatis were
truly better off than most other ethnic groups and especially the high caste
Hindus in the early (or prior to) 1990s as the data here suggest. Finally,
part of the mass frustration fueling these and many other problems in
Nepal may have been a complete lack of redistribution in the form of
developmental, infrastructural, or social policies among the different
groups especially along spatial lines. After all, as many believe inequality
can fuel social unrest, further inciting political violence, which is what
appears to be happening in Nepal today.
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